Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) is a theory of the design principles underlying the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus (MBBN) that has been developed over the last 20 years. DAC assumes that the brain maintains stability between an embodied agent and its environment through action. It postulates that in order to act, or know how, the brain has to answer four fundamental questions: why, what, where, when. Thus the function of the brain is to continuously solve the, so called, H4W problem. The DAC theory is expressed as a robot based neural architecture organized in two complementary structures: layers and columns. The organizational layers are called: reactive, adaptive and contextual and its columnar organization defines the processing of states of the world, the self and the generation of action. Each layer is described with respect to its key hypotheses, implementation and specific benchmarks. After this overview of the key elements of DAC, the mapping of its key assumptions towards the invertebrate and mammalian brain is described. In particular, this review will focus on the systems involved in realizing the core principles underlying the reactive layer: the allostatic control of fundamental behavior systems in the vertebrate brain and the emergent non-linearity through neuronal mass action in the locust brain. The adaptive layer will be analyzed in terms of the classical conditioning paradigm and its neuronal substrate the amygdala-cerebellum-neocortex complex together with episodic memory and the formation of sense-act couplets in the hippocampus. For the contextual layer the ability of circuits in the prefrontal cortex to acquire and express contextual plans for action is described. The general overview of DAC's explanation of MBBN is combined by examples of application scenarios in which DAC has been validated including mobile and humanoid robots, neurorehabilitation and the large-scale interactive space Ada. After 20 years of research DAC can be considered a mature theory of MBBN. It has build up a track record of explaining core aspects of mind, brain and behavior, has made testable and verified predictions at the level of behavior, physiology and anatomy, has been shown to be able to control complex real-world artefacts and has been successfully applied to brain repair and 2212-683X/$ -see front matter ª
Introduction
Evolution progresses by the conservation of basic design principles (Kirschner & Gerhart, 2006) . This is particularly expressed in the brains and bodies of the many animal species that have evolved since the Cambrian about 500 million years ago. What are the common design principles that underlie all the brains that have ever existed? This paper gives an overview of one specific answer to this question: the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory of the Mind, Body and Brain. Given the inseparability of these phenomena it might be more appropriate to speak for the Mind, Body, and Brain Nexus (MBBN). The first paper on DAC was published in 1992 (Verschure, Krose, & Pfeifer, 1992 ) and now 20 years on and at the inauguration of a new journal dedicated to the biologically grounded understanding of cognitive architectures it seems a good moment to take stock. Hence, this paper aims to provide a fairly exhaustive overview of the trajectory that the DAC theory has taken through the landscape of mind, brain and behavior.
DAC takes ''mind'' to mean the functional properties of embodied brains (Verschure, 1997) where the body or soma is the physical realization of the living entity with its specific morphology and the brain is defined as its control system. Brains can be seen to mediate between the needs of the internal environment, the body and the brain itself and the external environment with its resources and challenges, a definition at least going back to Pavlov (Pavlov, 1927) . This mediation in the service of survival and reproduction can be seen as a form of allostasis (Schulkin, 2004; Sterling & Eyer, 1988) where action is generated to approximate stability in the agent-environment interaction (Sanchez-Fibla, Bernardet, & Verschure, 2010a) .
Methodologically DAC proposes that theories of the MBBN will take the shape of physically instantiated, i.e. robot based, control architectures constrained by behavior, anatomy and physiology. The philosophical roots of this proposal go back to the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668 -1744 who proposed that science as an approach towards understanding reality must focus on how things are made, based on the principle that the truth and the made are convertible (''verum et factum convertuntur'') or that the truth is equal to the made (''verum esse ipsum factum''). Indeed, Harvey relied on a hydraulic mechanism metaphor to interpret and explain his anatomical observations of the heart and blood circulation exploiting available artefacts (Novell, 1990; Pulkkinen, 2006) , while the discovery by Watson and Crick of the structure of deoxyribonucleic acid was based on the active construction of a mechanical model, a purposefully build artefact (Crick, 1990) . Despite the insight these artefact driven models rendered, many aspects of the meaning of circulation and DNA were fully unclear at the time and are still being discovered today. Hence, the model facilitated the scientific discovery process without actually mimicking biological reality, rather it provided a suitably defined abstraction. In contrast, in an era where data itself has become a commodity some aim at exactly mimicking the complexities found in nature starting at the lowest level of description (Markram, 2006) . The challenges such an approach faces are manifold: it assumes a strict bottom up causality which has been put in doubt both in physics and in neuroscience, it makes the unsubstantiated assumption, already questioned by Hobbes, that the observations that provide scientific data are theoretically unbiased, it ignores the tight coupling between the many levels of organization found in biological systems, it fails to distinguish structural and functional levels of description and the simple fact that mimicry does not imply understanding as the, so called, cargo cults of the Pacific ocean had to discover at their own peril (Bell, 1999; Carandini, 2012; Gazzaniga, 2011; Pfeifer & Verschure, 1994) .
The validity of a theory will depend on its ability to explain data, make testable predictions and provide control over control over natural and artificial systems. So the question is what data a model of the MBBN should be accounting for. In case of the brain we have to include not only its physiological and anatomical properties but also especially the behaviour brains generate through the bodies in which they are embedded, i.e. brains evolved to generate action. This method is called convergent validation (Verschure, 1996) . Convergent validation is a response to the, so called, indeterminacy problem that states that mathematically a set of data points can be described by a practically unlimited set of functions, each being a model (Glimcher, 2005; Moore, 1956) . The practical consequence of convergent validation is that in order to behave a computational models needs a body which is provided by a robot. Precursors of this approach can be found in the conceptual Sowbug of Tolman (Tolman, 1939) and the, so called, turtles of Grey Walter (Walter, 1951) . One of the first examples of this approach in the modern era is the work by Edelman and co-workers on the NOMAD series of real-world artefacts (Edelman, Reeke, Gall, & Tononi, 1992; Verschure, Wray, Sporns, Tononi, & Edelman, 1995) . It is important to emphasize that in this view the modeller seeks constraints in nature in order to falsify models and validate insight as opposed to inspiration or mimicry, as in so called bioinspiration or biomimetics, and thus it is more appropriate to designate DAC based models as forms of biologically grounded or constrained modelling. Hence, DAC is based on a methodology that sees the artefact as a theory purposefully build to generate data which allows for a direct comparison with data obtained from natural phenomena at as many levels of description as available.
The brain is evolution's answer to the H4W problem DAC proposes that any brain answer four questions in order to generate action or to realize the 'How' of survival. These are:
1. Why: the motivation for action in terms of needs, drives and goals; 2. What: the objects in the world that actions pertain to; 3. Where: the location of objects in the world and the self; 4. When: the timing of action relative to the dynamics of the world. For instance, in order to successfully localize and consume food the agent will have to know how to retrieve and consume the food item, detect that it is hungry and motivate its behavior accordingly (Why) , that this specific food item will satisfy the need (What) that the food is hanging on a tree (Where) that can be reached at night (When). This is the H4W problem for short and each of the Ws designates a large set of sub questions of varying complexity. H4W has to be answered at different spatio-temporal scales from the immediate grasping action up to the recognition of the tree and the planning of the trajectory to find it from the home base (see (Verschure & Pezzulo, In Preparation) for a more detailed treatment).
DAC is a theory of how the MBBN solves the H4W problem. Answering H4W requires the tight coordination of a number of processes ranging from the skeletal-muscle system to consciousness. Hence, this implies that a theory must define these processes together with their control signals and protocols. In other words the answer to H4W will necessarily take the form of an architecture of MBBN. An architecture specifies the number and nature of its underlying processes, their representations and communication protocols together with an overall control structure. The architecture specifies how processes interact, e.g. in parallel or sequence, and under which conditions, e.g. upon completion or exchanging partial representations. In the specific realm of mind and brain or of cognitive architectures the now widely accepted tight coupling between perception, motivation, emotion, cognition and action and their strong grounding in the interaction with the real world through the embodiment of the agent puts strong constraints on what can be called an architecture of MBBN. DAC distinguishes partial and complete architectures. The former describe subsets of processes comprising MNNB, such as architectures of perception, while complete architectures aim at defining and capturing the complete set. DAC is one of the few examples of the latter.
An early example of the attempt to capture the architecture underlying adaptive behavior goes back to Romanes who in the late 19th century argued that across the animal kingdom from amoebas to humans the complexity of behavior resulted from the relative contributions of reflex, instinct and reason (Romanes, 1888) . The DAC architecture comprising four layers: Soma, Reactive, Adaptive and Contextual. These layers are intersected by three columns: states of the world derived through exosensing, states of the self derived through endosensing and their interface in action (Fig. 1) .
The somatic level designates the body itself and defines three fundamental sources of information: sensation, needs and actuation. Sensation is driven by external and internal sources of stimulation (or exo-and endosensing, respectively). Needs are defined by the essential variables that assure survival. Actuation is defined by the control of the skeletal-muscle system 2 . The reactive level (Verschure, Krose, & Pfeifer, 1993) comprises fast predefined sensorimotor loops that support direct behaviors underlying basic functionality defined by opposing behavioral systems of fight, flight, freeze, feed and reproduce or the 5Fs (Gray, 1987) . Each of these reflexes is triggered by low complexity signals and directly coupled to specific affective states of the agent, i.e. behavior serves the reduction of needs (Hull, 1943) . Hence, the primitive organizational elements of the reactive layer are sense-affect-act triades. Behaviorally the performance is what one would expect from a, so called, Braitenberg vehicle (Braitenberg, 1984; Walter, 1963) or a subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986) . However, the distinguishing feature of the DAC reactive layer is that it is part of a larger architecture. The activation of a reflex carries essential information on the interaction between the agent and the world that is a key control signal for subsequent layers. The reactive layer defines these signals as internal states or valence markers. In order to avoid conflicts between internal states, such as between avoidance and approach, a competitive relationship exists between the different internal states implemented by the, so called, Internal State Selector (ISS). Activation of internal states also regulates the engagement of subsequent layers of DAC as will be described below. A further distinguishing feature of this layer is that it is modeled in terms of an allostatic process that regulates a number of homeostatic behavior sub-systems (Eng et al., 2002; Sanchez-Fibla, Bernardet, Wasserman, et al., 2010) which is both closer to the dynamics of physiological systems and scalable as opposed to the more phenomenological behavior based cartoons found in, so called, behavior based robotics (Arkin, 1998) . This allostatic control model will be described further below.
The reactive layer of DAC has been generalized towards invertebrate neuroethology. These experiments with both mobile and flying robots have addressed the opto-motor system of flying insects (Borst, Haag, & Reiff, 2010) combined with their chemical search capabilities (Hansson, 2002) . These experiments have addressed the question on the relationship between the specific sensory capabilities of insects with dedicated search and localization related behavioral patterns. In particular, the reactive layer of DAC has been used to understand the specific behavior of the male moth in localizing pheromone sources where it casts against the wind direction in the absence of an odor while surging upwind when an odour pocket is detected. These DAC based robot experiments have shown the tight coupling between sensory processing and action (Bermúdez i Badia, Bernardet, Guanella, Pyk, & Verschure, 2007; Pyk et al., 2006) . Indeed, it has been shown that this search behavior of moths can be considered optimal from a theoretical perspective (Balkovsky & Shraiman, 2002) and it has also been called infotaxis (Vergassola, Villermaux, & Shraiman, 2007) . For instance, when comparing odor localization strategies produced by a Braitenberg based model with the specific behavioral strategy displayed by male moths the latter outperform the former in terms of search time and trajectory length (Bermudez i Badia & Verschure, 2009) .
The adaptive layer extends the sensori-motor loops of the reactive layer with acquired sensor and action states (Fig. 2) . Hence, it allows the agent to escape from strictly predefined reflexes through learning. The adaptive layer is interfaced to the full sensorium of the agent, its needs and effector systems and receiving internal state information from the reactive layer and in turn generating motor output. Verschure & Coolen, 1991; . At this layer adaptive mechanisms are deployed to deal with the fundamental unpredictability of both the internal and the external environment. Through learning, a state space of sensation and action is acquired together with its direct association following the paradigm of classical conditioning.
The learning dynamics of the adaptive layer is defined in terms of prediction based Hebbian learning and has been phrased in a general formal framework called correlative subspace learning (CSL) . We define the following abbreviations for the activities in the different simulated neuronal populations ( Fig. 2) : Activity:
Weight matrices: Across these layers we can distinguish three functional columns of organization: exosensing defined as the sensation and perception of the world (blue), endosensing which is detecting and signaling states derived from the physically instantiated self (green) and the interface to the world through action (red). At the level of the contextual layer these three axes become tightly integrated. The arrows show the primary flow of information mapping exo-and endosensing into action. See text for further explanation.
Inputs to IS:
With these definitions the dynamics of the adaptive and reactive layer can be written as (Eq. (1):
The weights are updated following the Correlative Subspace Learning (CSL) rule (Eq. (2)):
where g is a variable learning rate. In CSL the learning dynamics is determined by two product terms xy T 1 xx T and xr T , which we can interpret as the sensory prediction of x and the motor prediction of r, respectively. f varies between À1 and 1 and balances the relative impact of either perceptual or motor learning. With a f of À1 perceptual learning dominates and Eq. (1) is identical to the so called Oja learning rule (Oja, 1982) . With a value of 1 the learning dynamics aims at minimizing the motor prediction error. In perceptual learning the weight changes are driven by the discrepancy between actual sensory events, x, and those expected given the state of IS, e. DAC refers to e as the perceptual prototype. We have shown that this model is able to find optimal solutions in a foraging task where visual landmarks (CS) have to be associated with specific rotations (CR) in order to obtain a reward .
The adaptive layer of DAC provides a solution to the fundamental symbol grounding problem that real-world systems face (Harnad, 1990; Searle, 1980; Verschure, 1993 Verschure, , 1998a because it acquires the state space of the agent on the basis of its interaction with the environment. In a more general sense we could speak of a problem of priors that interprets the fundamental problems faced by artificial systems such as symbol grounding, the frame problem and the frame of reference problem as resulting from the misunderstanding of the prior information that has been embedded in the system by the human designer (Verschure, 1998b) . Indeed in recent years other authors have made similar suggestions towards addressing this issue (Cangelosi, 2010; Steels, 2008) . From a biological and psychological perspective the adaptive layer is a model of classical or Pavlovian conditioning (Mackintosh, 1974; Pavlov, 1927) which will be further elaborated below. In terms of more normative approaches towards learning as pursued in machine learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998 ) the adaptive layer acts as the encoder of sensory states turning sensory signals into percepts onto which policies can be acquired.
In DAC I perceptual learning was achieved by changing W through Hebbian learning (Verschure & Coolen, 1991; . The insistence on Hebbian learning was to build models that were based on minimal assumptions, i.e. locality of information, and as such a response to the many supervised learning schemes of the time (Verschure, 1990 (Verschure, , 1992 . Using a simulated robot we showed that, although the associative learning of the system pertained to instantaneous sensori-motor events, the robot would display emergent behavioral patterns such as ''wall following''. In a further extension DAC I was applied to a robot foraging task based on block sorting where the model was augmented with a value based learning system guiding plasticity (Verschure et al., 1995) . However, DAC I showed fundamental shortcomings such as an excessive dependence on the details of input sampling and the overgeneralization of actions . DAC II was defined to solve these problems using a new prediction based local learning rule of which CSL, defined above, is the most general formulation.
CSL captures the law of associative competition formulated by Rescorla and Wagner that describes the impact of the paired presentation of a particular Conditioned Stimulus (CS) and Unconditioned Stimulus (US) on the probability of observing Conditioned Responses (CR). Their law of associative competition emphasizes that this associative change will depend on how unexpected the CS is given the US ( Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . The CSL model is also compatible with adaptive filter methods such as the Kalman filter and derived approaches (Kalman, 1960) . Similar methods have been applied to modeling the cortical mechanisms of perceptual learning (Rao & Ballard, 1999) or to solve robot navigation and learning problems (Porr & Wörgötter, 2006) . Indeed, by now the ''predictive brain'' hypothesis is much in vogue and is seen as an integrative framework for brain theory (Friston, 2010) and CSL can be seen as a specific instantiation of this, so called, free energy principle.
The adaptive layer allows the agent to overcome the predefined behavioral repertoire of the reactive layer and to successfully engage the a priori unpredictable aspects of the world. The weak pre-specification of the reactive layer combined with the learning mechanisms of the adaptive layer allows the DAC system to bootstrap itself to deal with novel and a priori unknown state spaces. This adaptation occurs in a restricted temporal window of relatively immediate interaction. However, in order to escape from the ''now'' other learning systems must be engaged. The adaptive layer and the state space it acquires, provides a foundation for these more advanced learning and memory intense learning systems: the contextual layer.
A unique application of DAC II has been the human accessible space Ada (Eng, Klein et al., 2003) . Ada was an 180 m 2 exhibition space that provided a range of complex interactions with its visitors. Over half a million people visited the exhibit during the summer of 2002 as part of the Swiss National Expo 02. The reactive layer of DAC was used to set the behavioral goal functions of Ada to optimize interaction, recognition and distribution of visitors. The ability of the agent to achieve these goals defined an overall goal function or ''Happiness''. Based on the changes in these goal functions and the ability to achieve need reduction the emotional states of Ada were defined following a valence and arousal model (Russell, 1980) consistent with the notion of epistemic emotions. These emotional states in turn would be expressed by Ada through a multi-modal composition synthesized in real-time (Wasserman, Manzolli, Eng, & Verschure, 2003) . In addition the adaptive layer of DAC was used to acquire guiding cues generated by the luminous floor tiles of Ada (Delbrück et al., 2007) that could successfully influence the position and movement direction of visitors (Eng, Douglas, & Verschure, 2005) .
The contextual layer of DAC develops the state space acquired by the adaptive layer to generate behavioral plans or policies (Verschure & Voegtlin, 1999; Voegtlin & Verschure, 1998) . The atomic elements of these plans are formed by the state space of exo-and endosensing constructed by the adaptive layer or sensori-motor contingencies (Fig. 3) . The contextual layer comprises systems for short and long-term and working memory (STM, LTM and WM, respectively). These memory systems allow for the formation of (1) the perceptual prototype e and the motor activity m generated by the adaptive layer are acquired and stored as a segment if the discrepancy between predicted and occurring sensory states, D, falls below its predefined threshold H D . D is the time averaged reconstruction error of the perceptual learning system: x À e. (2) If a goal state is reached, e.g. reward or punishment detected, the content of STM is retained in LTM as a sequence conserving its order and STM is reset. Every sequence is labeled with respect to the specific goal and internal state it pertains to. (3) The motor population MM receives input from the IS populations according to the rules of the adaptive layer. (4) If the input of the IS population to MM is sub-threshold, the values of the current CS prototypes, e, are matched against those stored in LTM. (5) The MM population receives the motor response calculated as a weighted sum over the memory segments of LTM as input. (6) The segments that contributed to the action that was executed will prospectively bias segments they are associated with. sequential representations of states of the environment and actions generated by the agent or its acquired sensory-motor contingencies. The acquisition and retention of these sequences is conditional on the goal achievement of the agent and the absence of reactive layer activation. These behavioral plans can be recalled through sensory matching and internal chaining among the elements of the retained memory sequences. The dynamic states that this process entails are DAC's working memory system.
Initially, DAC's behavior is dominated by the reactive layer from which the adaptive layer is bootstrapped. Once the average sensory reconstruction error falls below a specific reconstruction threshold, H R , the contextual layer is enabled and ongoing sensori-motor contingencies are stored in its STM buffer comprising the sensory prototype e and the action m AL , respectively. Once a goal state is reached the STM sequence is retained in LTM. The contribution of LTM segment k of sequence n, d nk , to decision making and action generation is defined by four factors perception, or the state of the collector unit, c nk , memory defined by the state of the trigger unit, t nk , the distance to the goal state, g nk , and valence, m n (Eq. (3)):
c nk is the time integrated perceptual similarity of the stored and current sensory prototype. This similarity is calculated using distance function dist, which is usually the normalized Euclidian distance. The trigger unit, t nk , is the time integrated memory bias defined by the LTM connectivity matrix P that sums over all LTM segments, N LTM , and the sequence length, N STM . All LTM segments that contributed to the generation of the action project their decision-making score, d ij , to segment k of sequence n if they are connected. This allows for the chaining of the segments of sequences on the basis of memory. t nk implements the working memory of the contextual layer. Relevant LTM segments are selected using the Dirac d function that returns one when the stored motor state, m ij , matches the state of the motor population of the adaptive layer, m mm . g nk defines the inverse normalized distance of segment k of sequence n to the goal state of this sequence n in terms of its total number of elements. This favors segments closer to goal states in the dominance over the action selection stage. Once d of all segments has been updated all segments that exceed the decision making threshold H D project their motor state, m nk , onto the motor population MM. After action selection through the winner-take-all process of MM the selected action is executed and the spreading activation of the memory bias updates the values of the trigger units t. Subsequently the LTM connectivity matrix P can be updated to reflect specific rules (see below).
The extension of DAC with the contextual layer was designated DAC III and was tested in a foraging benchmark including multiple targets in cluttered environments (Verschure & Voegtlin, 1999) . In addition, this model was used to address the question of how the adaptive and contextual layers interact. The adaptive layer defines the state space on which the contextual layer operates. Experiments with simulated and physical robots show, however, that a feedback loop stabilizes the interaction between these two learning systems through behavior itself called behavioral feedback (Verschure, Voegtlin, & Douglas, 2003) . Behavioral feedback was quantified through a detailed analysis of the reconstruction error of the perceptual learning system of the adaptive layer together with two new measures called behavioral and sensor sampling entropy. First, it was shown that once the integrated perceptual reconstruction error D falls below its predefined threshold H R the activation of the contextual layer is irreversible, i.e. no instance of DAC was identified that would show any oscillations between the adaptive and contextual levels of learning and control. Hence, this could be interpreted as a stage transition akin to those observed in cognitive development (Piaget, 1972) . Second, agents with the contextual layer enabled displayed a significantly lower value of D than those with this layer disabled. Given that there is no internal feedback between the contextual and adaptive layers this effect must result from a significant difference in the behavior that these layers of DAC generate. Indeed, both behavior and sensor sampling of the contextual layer is significantly less variable than that of the adaptive layer. This demonstrated that the behavioral plans acquired by the contextual layer carve out an effective behavioral subspace rendering its world more predictable and thus its perceptual reconstruction error smaller. Behavioral feedback can be seen as an example of, so called, morphological computation (Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007) at the level of the whole agent. As opposed to exploiting the interplay between control and morphology of the body and in this way reducing the complexity of control, behavioral feedback exploits the specifics of the physical interaction between the agent and its environment.
One question is how a sequential memory system can be implemented by neuronal systems. To address this question a model of STM and LTM of DAC III has been proposed based on recurrently coupled self-organizing maps (Voegtlin & Verschure, 1998) . This model addressed the problem that systems for short and long-term memory require different learning dynamics balancing stability versus plasticity (Grossberg, 1987) . In order to rapidly acquire information a short-term acquisition system will be highly plastic at the cost of accumulating more noise and displaying instability in its performance. A system for permanent storage must assure robust retention with minimal noise and overlaps between memory states implying longer acquisition time. DAC IV solved this problem by coupling the sensori-motor networks of the adaptive layer in parallel to two recurrently coupled networks. The first one acquired states as the agent was behaving in the environment while the other retained these states that were played back from the first STM model over the primary sensor and motor areas. Hence, DAC IV exploited a dedicated phase in the processing of memory using replay to transfer information from STM to LTM. Indeed, such task dependent replay has been found in the rodent hippocampus (Foster & Wilson, 2006; Lee & Wilson, 2002) . The main problem faced by this approach called DAC IV, however, was the overall limited capacity of memory it rendered in a stable regime which is a well known problem of recurrent networks (Knusel, Wyss, Konig, & Verschure, 2004) .
A further question was whether the solutions that DAC III found for foraging could be considered optimal. Lacking consensus benchmarks and comparable approaches a more formal approach was taken based on work by Massaro on multi-modal speech perception where Bayesian integration was proposed as a universal principle of perception (Massaro, 1997; Massaro & Stork, 1998) . Indeed, DAC comprises constructs that are analogs of the central components of a Bayesian analysis: goals, actions, hypotheses, observations, experience, prior probabilities and a score function. By phrasing the foraging tasks performed with the DAC architecture in Bayesian terms it was shown that the contextual layer generates those actions that are optimal in a Bayesian sense, DAC V (Althaus & Verschure, 1999; Verschure & Althaus, 2003) .
The contextual layer of DAC V acquires hypotheses on how to achieve specific goals by virtue of the adaptive layer and the interaction with the environment. The matching and competition processes explore this knowledge base of LTM with the objective to select the optimal action where optimality is defined as maximizing reward (e.g. targets in a foraging task) while minimizing punishment (e.g. collisions). In a Bayesian perspective the optimal action, a, is the one that optimizes the expected gain hgi a (Eq. (4)):
where p(s n |r) is the posterior probability defined by Bayes rule and G g (s n ,a) is a score function that defines the gain obtained from executing action a if s n is true. In case of DAC V s and r are the perceptual prototypes of the contextual and adaptive layer, respectively and the value of G is determined by the value labeling of the LTM sequences. DAC V showed that the actions selected by the contextual layer are optimal with respect to G. This demonstration showed that DAC V is an autonomous rational system that acquires its own knowledge through its interaction with the environment and subsequently uses it in a Bayes optimal fashion to reach its goals. The chaining mechanism of the contextual layer displays both sequence and goal fidelity. Sequence fidelity is defined by the modulation of the value of the trigger units, t nk by other segments belonging to the same sequence. DAC III and DAC V exploited a nearest neighbor forward chaining where segments propagate a biasing signal to their direct neighbor closer to the goal state of the sequence. In order to be more robust to variability in the sensor states and thus to noise in the perceptual prototypes that drive the memory matching process (Eq. (3)) this was expanded to, so called, memory smoothing where the propagation of the memory biasing signal along a sequence follows a Gaussian distribution (Ringwald & Verschure, 2007) . Memory smoothing was introduced in order to allow the contextual layer to integrate across a number of modalities such as spatial information and sensory cues. Goal based sequences contain further implicit information which was captured in the notion of goal fidelity. Goal fidelity describes a process that modulates the decision making score of each segment by its inverse normalized distance to the goal state of its sequence. However, distance in terms of memory segments and actual physical distance to be covered to physically reach a goal are not necessarily similar. Moreover, the goal state of a sequence could either be appetitive or aversive which could also be expressed in the goal distance measure. Hence, the goal fidelity measure was expanded to reflect these factors. This augmented model was applied to foraging benchmarks comparing it to an optimal POMDP solution (Thrun, 2000; Thrun, Burgard, & Fox, 2005 ). DAC's performance was only ten percent lower then that of the MC-POM-DP method. This result is remarkable considering that DAC is fully self-contained, does not require a priori global information, i.e. it uses purely egocentric actions as opposed to the benchmark POMDP that relies on allocentric ones. Ultimately both sequence and goal fidelity could be integrated into one mechanism that regulates the biasing of the contextual layer's working memory in terms of the overall task.
A fundamental limitation of DAC was that all actions were encoded in egocentric terms. Hence, slight variations in the position of the agent would lead to a rapid divergence in the memory matching mechanisms and thus the trajectories generated would increasingly diverge from those followed during learning. To overcome this problem, experiments were performed that replaced egocentric action encoding with an allocentric definition of a movement vector that points to the location of the next landmark (Marcos, Sanchez-Fibla, . This was achieved using a path integration mechanism that accumulates rotations and translations as the agent moves between landmarks. Using a range of maze learning benchmarks it was shown how this approach leads to robust maze navigation and learning even when significant noise is applied to the motor output. This result illustrates the relationship between taxon versus route navigation strategies (Redish, 1999) . The reactive egocentric control system is able to succeed fulfilling the robot's needs when the information from the reward does not have any conflicts or can be directly detected by the sensors (taxon based strategy). However, when a direct path to rewards is not available or landmarks cannot be detected the contextual control system is required to generate a route using an allocentric method.
Another variation on the acquisition of allocentric navigation strategies with DAC was recently proposed for mapless navigation. This variation explored the lower bounds on the elements of a contextual memory exploring the notion that a contextual memory supporting navigation could be conceptualized as a graph where the nodes are defined by landmarks and their connections by acquired heading directions (Kubie & Fenton, 2009 ). Indeed, it has been shown that this approach towards mapless navigation is both robust on robots performing multi-modal chemical search tasks and is consistent with ant navigation behavior (Mathews et al., 2009; Mathews, Verschure, & Bermudez i Badia, 2010) . Robots controlled by this model are able of return to their original position after reaching the target and also recover from kidnapping, i.e. displacements within the task domain.
neuroDAC DAC was developed as a model of the MBBN and assumes that vertebrate brains share a common ''bauplan'' (Allman & Martin, 2000; Kaas et al., 2007) and that this ''bauplan'' is geared towards solving the H4W problem. In doing so DAC has taken the paradigms of classical and operant conditioning as its first targets where classical conditioning covers the reactive and adaptive levels while operant conditioning defines the capabilities of the contextual layer. Methodologically DAC pursues a strategy of convergent validation where a model is validated against an expanding set of constraints from multiple levels of description (see Introduction). Up to DAC V the main validation of this framework involved behavior combining the models with robots. However, the internal structures of the model are functional hypotheses on the neuronal substrate. DAĆs core concepts are consistent with notions from neurobiology including the idea of layered or hierarchical control, distributed representation, prediction based learning, redundancy through parallelism, behaviour-based decomposition, and the centrality of embodiment and learning (Chiel & Beer, 1997; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999) . In order to test the specific mapping of these hypotheses, a second series of models have been developed which can be summarized as neuroDAC (Fig. 4) . neuroDAC comprises core structures of the neuroaxis including detailed biologically constrained models of the cerebellum, brainstem, limbic system, hippocampus, thalamus and a number of areas of the cerebral cortex.
At the level of reactive control the main objective has been to capture the smooth and robust control of stereotyped behaviors as seen in defensive or aggressive behavior. One salient feature of these behaviors is that the response intensity varies with the salience of the target stimulus (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989) . In addition, it has been proposed that the switching between behavioral subsystems depends on the coordinating action of different neuromodulators across the neuraxis (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) . These elements of reactive control have been modeled using the concept of allostasis (Fig. 5) .
Essentially this approach assumes that agents comprise a number of behavior systems that are coupled to the environment through virtual force fields comprising attractors and repellors, an idea going back to the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1936) and formalized half a century later in robotics (Khatib, 1986) . Each homeostatic controller regulates a specific behavior system that reduces one specific need of the agent, e.g. the 5Fs. Each need reduction system can be seen as optimizing its own goal function through action . These actions are realized in space on the basis of a behavior system's specific force field going beyond strict approach and avoidance but rather defining the probability to observe a discrete action at a specific location. Each behavior sub-system thus decouples space from action and defines a potentiality for spatialized action or an affordance gradient. The allostatic controller sets the gains and thresholds of each homeostatic behavior subsystem allowing for behavior switching and behavioral sustain, i.e. once behaviors are initiated they must be completed before switching can take place. The affordance gradient approach has shown to be both robust and consistent with rodent behavior and physiological markers of arousal in an open field (Sanchez-Fibla, Bernardet, Wasserman, et al., 2010) . In addition, affordance gradients provide for a common currency in motor control because of the probabilistic regulation of action. One question this approach faces is how affordance gradients can be constructed from acquired information in order to escape from strict pre-specification. Two solutions have been proposed: one relying on the integration across multiple hippocampal place fields (SanchezFibla, Bernardet, & Verschure, 2010b ) and the other exploiting exploration and associative mechanisms that allow the agent to acquire the variable set of discrete actions that specific objects afford (Sanchez-Fibla et al., 2010b) . The first solution has also been successfully pursued in models of goal oriented learning in the hippocampus (Erdem & Hasselmo, 2012) .
With respect to invertebrate neuroethology the reactive layer of DAC has provided a framework for the study of the computational principles underlying insect behavior. Insects are highly robust in the control of flight in dynamic environments largely based on predefined neuronal sensori-motor loops (Borst et al., 2010) . A typical example of the neuronal machinery behind this outstanding performance is the Lobula Giant Movement Detector wide-field neuron of the locust (LGMD) which has been shown to accurately reflect time to collision in its firing rate which serves collision avoidance (Gabbiani, Krapp, Koch, & Laurent, 2002; Gabbiani et al., 2004) . The key principles of the LGMD have been successfully mapped to robot based models (Rind, Blanchard, & Verschure, 1999; Rind, Santer, Blanchard, & Verschure, 2003) . In particular within the context of DAC the question has been addressed whether the non-linear property of the
LGMD neuron to show a multiplicative response, was local to its biophysical and anatomical properties, as suggested in the literature, or emerges from the interaction among a range of reactive processing stages starting with the photo receptors downstream to the LGMD. This question is essential in understanding the computational boundaries of neurons. Using an highly optimal and anatomically constrained neuronal model of the LGMD it was shown that all physiological characteristics can be accounted for without resorting to local non-linear operations while also being able to control a high-speed robot (Bermudez i Badia, . Hence, here the DAC framework provided a context to directly elucidate a fundamental question in neuroscience and provide the answer that neurons do not seem to multiply.
The adaptive layer acquires the sensori-motor state space by segregating two processing streams that optimize perceptual and behavioral prediction, respectively as defined by the CSL framework. This raises the question whether the neuronal substrate of classical conditioning is organized along a similar dual pathway (Fig. 6) . Indeed, Mowrer already proposed a two-factor model of learning involving both behavior and emotional states (Mowrer & Hobart, 1960) . This was further elaborated by Konorski who proposed the existence of two distinct associative learning mechanisms: a fast non-specific preparatory learning system (NLS), that within a few trials produces a conditioning dependent state of arousal and elicits simple self-protective reaction patterns and a slow specific or consummatory learning system (SLS) that is responsible for the generation of motor responses specific to the US (Konorski, 1967) . This became known as the Two Phase theory of classical conditioning (Ellison & Konorski, 1964; Konorski, 1948) . The first fast phase acquires the apparent cause-effect relationship of the stimuli involved, while the second slow phase allows Fig. 5 The allostatic control model of the reactive layer. Behavior results from the interaction of a number of homeostatic behavioral control models using an allostatic controller. In the example a security and arousal sub-system are considered driving homing and exploration, respectively. The allostatic control model can 1: dynamically adjust the intensity of the goal gradients, 2: adjust desired values of sub systems, 3: modulate the integration of the outputs of the homeostatic behavior systems and 4: modulate the internal dynamics of individual behavior systems. See text for further explanation. Adapted from (Sanchez-Fibla, Bernardet, Wasserman, et al., 2010) . the agent to alter its relationship with the outside world through action. At an abstract level the CSL framework captures both these elements by optimizing the prediction of both the CS and the US/UR complex (Eq. (2)). At a more detailed level the preparatory fast learning system has been modeled in reference to the interaction of the amygdala, nucleus basalis of Maynert and the auditory cortex (Sanchez-Montanes, König, & Verschure, 2002; Sánchez-Montañés, Verschure, & König, 2000) replicating conditioning dependent changes observed in the primary auditory cortex (Kilgard & Merzenich, 1998; Weinberger, 2004) . The learning dynamics of this model exploits, so called, spike-time dependent plasticity (Stuart & Sakmann, 1994; Stuart, Spruston, Sakmann, & Häusser, 1997) where synaptic plasticity is regulated by signals that propagate back into the dendrite from the soma upon spike initiation. Key to this model of the NSL was the modulating of these backpropagating action potentials (BAP) by local inhibitory neurons that were recurrently coupled to the excitatory population. Essentially this recurrent inhibition defines a dynamic recruitment of excitatory neurons eligible to change their receptive fields dependent on their latency of response relative to the stimulus onset. In case the excitatory population contains neurons that are well tuned to the stimulus they will respond with a short latency and drive up the shunting inhibition of the BAPs preventing other neurons from adjusting their receptive fields. The presentation of an Unconditioned Stimulus such as a shock would inhibit these interneurons and thus again allow plasticity to occur and more neurons to tune to the conditioned stimulus. Recently this kind of regulation of plasticity by cortical inhibitory interneurons has been described in auditory conditioning in the rat (Letzkus et al., 2011) . The hypothesis is that this circuit property contributes to the perceptual prediction based learning previously identified in the adaptive layer of DAC in CSL.
The specific motor learning components of the adaptive layer have been explained in terms of the learning dynamics of the cerebellum (Hofstötter, Mintz, & Verschure, 2002; Hofstötter et al., 2005) . This model particularly emphasized the negative feedback that exists between the output stage of the cerebellum, the deep nucleus, and the inferior olive, which is the source of the US driven climbing fiber teaching or error signal (Thompson, 2005) . The model showed that this negative feedback loop stabilizes learning by predicting the occurrence of motor errors. This provides the neuronal substrate of the predictive motor learning of the adaptive layer CSL framework.
The overall integration of these two components of the adaptive layer has been achieved showing that the sensory learning phase appears to be focused on CS identification rather then preparation alone. Recent work has shown that this stimulus identification phase is essential in order to facilitate the motor learning performed by the cerebellum (Inderbitzin, Herreros-Alonso, & Verschure, 2010) . The prediction that followed from these simulation and robot studies is that the cerebellum as a learning machine relies on extra cerebellar structures to define the states over which it learns its action triggers and amplitude control signals. In order for these structures to access the cerebellar learning machine, event representations have to overcome a gating mechanism that depend on the input stages of the cerebellum: the pons and the granule cells. Hence, only stimulus representations with sufficient energy, i.e. with a large enough population response in the cortex, will succeed in engaging cerebellar learning. In addition, this biologically constrained model of the adaptive layer provides a further interpretation of the two-phase theory of conditioning and suggests that the brain is organized into two processing streams: interval time processing in the cerebellum and event processing in the Telencephalon or the events in time hypothesis. In a follow up study it has been shown that in case of distributed event-time processes performance is enhanced in robot foraging at the cost of the inability to reconstruct explicit interval information (Marcos, Duff, Sanchez-Fibla, & Verschure, 2010) .
DAC has made the fundamental assumption that the contextual layer operates on highly integrated representations of sensori-motor couplets. Lisman (2005) hypothesized that given the distinct features of the inputs the hippocampus receives from the entorhinal cortex (EC), sensory information from the lateral EC (LEC) and spatial information from the grid cells of the medial EC (MEC), the Dentate Gyrus (DG) could form sense-act couplets as predicted by the DAC architecture (Lisman, 2007) . In order to address this hypothesis at the core of DAC first the properties of LEC and MEC had to be better understood. The high level sensory responses found in LEC, which is at the end of the ventral visual stream, have been modeled following two approaches. The first exploits the detailed topology of cortical connectivity to generate, so called, Temporal Population Code (TPC). The TPC has shown to be both physiologically consistent and functionally fast and robust in a range of benchmarks (Luvizotto, Rennó-Costa, & Verschure, 2012; Wyss, Konig, & Verschure, 2003) . The second approach has relied on, so called, objective functions to demonstrate that a complete ventral stream can be learned by a mobile robot on the basis of two computational principles: smoothness and de-correlation (Wyss, König, & Verschure, 2006) . In the context of DAC the grid cells of the MEC have been modeled using a twisted torus topology (Guanella, Kiper, & Verschure, 2007) . This model predicted that grid cells provide more information on location than place cells of the hippocampus . Subsequently, Rennó-Costa, Lisman, and Verschure (2010) have shown in an anatomically and physiologically constrained model how the representations of LEC and MEC can be multiplexed in the responses of the neurons in the DG; with the first step in the construction of sense-act couples occurring in the fixed divergent mapping of the EC onto the DG. This model explained the phenomenon of rate remapping of the population response in DG when visual cues are smoothly varying due to the morphing of the environment. It has been reported that the correlation of the population response of the DG in subsequent environments smoothly degrades, or remaps (Leutgeb, Leutgeb, Moser, & Moser, 2007) . The model of the DG could account for this effect but, more importantly for DAC, showed that the neurons in the DG provide an integrated encoding of action and sensory states as had been assumed in the contextual layer. Action information is here defined in terms of the changes in the responses of MEC, which define the change in position of the agent and thus the movement vector. DAC predicts that these states are read out from the DG-CA3 system by CA1 and presented to areas involved in planning and decision-making (Pennartz, Ito, Verschure, Battaglia, & Robbins, 2011) .
At the level of the contextual layer the primary goal is to understand the memory mechanisms of LTM and working memory. These have been mapped onto the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC). The PFC is located in the frontal lobe and is reciprocally connected to sensory as well as to motor areas. Neurons in this area have been shown to respond to sensory states, actions and their combinations (Fuster, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001) . Indeed, the PFC is strongly involved in executive functions (Barraclough, Conroy, & Lee, 2004) . So far all neuroscience oriented models of decision making are developed in complete isolation of the dynamics of real-world interaction and perception casting doubt on their plausibility (Beck et al., 2008; Wang, 2008) . Hence, DAC VI was developed to interpret these properties of PFC from the perspective of an integrated architecture. In particular, this model proposed an integrated memory unit that combines the key decision variables elaborated in the contextual layer (Eq. (3)) implementing the, so called, cognit hypothesis that distinguishes memory units of PFC as comprising interconnected neuronal populations (Fuster, 2009 ). The DAC memory unit comprises sensory, motor and valence states by developing receptive fields with the respective cortical and limbic areas (Fig. 7) . In addition, chaining between memory units is realized through the modulation of their lateral excitatory connections. These lateral connections are adapted following a Hebbian like learning rule and in their ensemble represent the possible structures of the task. A value dependent reward signal (Doya, 2008; Schultz, 2006) modulates the activity of the memory units in order to bias action selection towards the optimal solution of the goal-oriented task.
DAC VI was validated in robot navigation tasks and standard neuropsychological paradigms such as the towers of London test. Results showed that this model acquires rules and adapts to changing reward contingencies consistent with behavioral and physiological data. It was shown that the internal model acquired by the PFC-grounded contextual layer exploiting the PFC like dynamics of sustained activity and activity modulation can be effectively utilized in real-world planning following the previously established optimality criteria (Eq. (4)).
The DAC contextual layer described above had the primary goal of understanding the memory mechanisms of LTM and working memory for solving complex cognitive tasks. Such tasks require processes such as attention, prediction, anticipation and strong vertical interactions between different hierarchical layers of the brain. The DAC architecture was recently proposed as a unifying framework for integrating these different components of perception, cognition and action by addressing the interaction between bottom-up and top-down attention (Mathews & Verschure, 2011) . At the core of this model is the notion that the acquired world model of the contextual layer can provide a top-down bias on perceptual processing and bottom up saliency maps through a, so called, validation gate (VG). The VG defines in the multi-dimensional space in which the percepts of the adaptive layer are organized areas around the percepts in which feed-forward data can be accepted or should be considered as unexpected and thus require the allocation of resources and acquisition of new data, i.e. attention. This model, DAC VII, has been applied to robot and multi-object tracing tasks (Mathews & Verschure, 2011) and is now generalized towards humanoid robots.
The contextual layer of DAC predicts that decision making depends on a four factor model that combines perception, memory, goals and utility (Eq. (3)). The concrete neural mechanisms underlying the biasing of working memory supporting specific behavioral plans are not well understood and in general emphasis is placed on the role of the integration of firing rates driven by perceptual cues (Gold & Shadlen, 2007) . Pursuing the DAC derived prediction of a four factor model, a detailed analysis of the neuronal responses obtained in the dorsal premotor cortex during a so called counter manding task showed that whereas firing rate correlates with perceptual cues task history appears to be encoded in the inter trial variability of the neuronal responses (Marcos, Pani, Brunamonti, Ferraina, and Verschure, 2012) . A more detailed model of the contextual layer, DAC VIII that includes these dynamics has been shown to not only be more robust in foraging tasks but also to render a more compressed and less redundant memory structure (Marcos, Pani, Brunamonti, Ferraina, & Verschure, 2012) .
Discussion
This paper has given an overview of the DAC architecture of the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus. The key methodology of convergent validation combined with the notion of machines as theories has been motivated and different layers of DAC described together with their mapping onto the neuronal substrate. What this overview illustrates is that the incremental integration of constraints from multiple levels of description, i.e. anatomy, physiology and behavior, are essential to make progress in our understanding of MBBN. Following this approach DAC has provided new insights in the organization of behavior, perception, learning and decision-making that all have guided the advance of specific questions in the domain of neuroethology, psychology and neuroscience. In particular, DAC has given rise to a number of new concepts such as the notion of allostatic control of reactive behavior systems, the notion of affordance gradients, the notion of emergent non-linearity, the predictivecorrelative learning frame work of the adaptive layer and its mapping to the two-phase theory of classical conditioning and the events in time hypothesis combined with a new interpretation of the multiplexing of action and perception in the hippocampus rendering the sensori-motor couplets DAC had predicted. The contextual layer has shown that DAC is Bayesian optimal in foraging and has provided a parsimonious four factor model of decision making that has found direct support in neurophysiology while driving the notion of behavioral feedback. One of the key insights of these experiments is the tight coupling between brain, body and behavior as, for instance, expressed in the notion of behavioral feedback that was discovered with DAC III . Initially, DAC was seen as a method to bridge the explanatory gap between the distinguishable phenomena of mind, brain and behavior. Now the explorations in DAC have shown that these are tightly coupled phenomena or, in other words, should be considered an inseparable nexus of mind, brain, body and environment. DAC shows that as an integrated phenomenon this nexus can be best approached through real-world instantiated theories that combine methods from computing and robotics to validate core design principles following a path of convergent validation in constant dialog with the multi-level investigation of these phenomena in the empirical sciences.
DAC has been applied to a wide range of mobile, flying and humanoid robots and has shown to be an effective integration framework in complex mechatronic projects such as the industrial scale exhibition Ada (Fig. 8) .
Another source of validation to which the DAC framework has been applied is the domain of neurorehabilitation and neurorepair (Verschure, 2011) . The learning principles from DAC, such the balancing of perceptual and behavior learning of CSL, the role of tasks and goals and the primary role of sensori-motor contingencies in structuring perception and cognition have been generalized to a highly effective virtual reality based method for the rehabilitation of stroke that has shown to be more effective than commonly used therapy methods (Cameirao, Bermudez, Oller, & Verschure, 2011) . This shows that in order to find empirical validation of our theories they can be applied to clinical challenges. In this sense it is astonishing that given the wealth of models on the brain we still are facing such a crisis in the treatment of basic deficits of this structure. Hence, DAC proposes that in the development of theories of mind and brain beyond making testable predictions, real-world validation of Fig. 7 The PFC memory unit of DAC VI. The core of the memory unit is formed by neuronal representations of perceptual state e, action state m and value state v. The sensorimotor contingency is defined through the connectivity matrices W and V, respectively. Chaining is acquired through the lateral connections among the memory units P. See text for further explanation. Adapted from (Duff, Sanchez-Fibla, & Verschure, 2011) . been applied to real-world foraging tasks using the multi-segmented robot ''Synthetic Forager'' high-mobility platform custom developed by Robosoft SA (Bidart, France). (D) DAC is being generalized towards social interaction using the iCub humanoid platform (Metta, Sandini, Vernon, Natale, & Nori, 2008) .
theories of MBBN must be found either through robot benchmarks exposing a theory to behavioral constraints and/or direct clinical application in repairing the brain. If we consider that scientific theories are required to explain, predict and control, DAC has provided explanations for a number of core features of the MBBN, has made specific predictions that were confirmed in the investigation of the neuronal substrate and has been able to control complex artefacts and brain repair. After 20 years of toiling DAC is a mature theory of MBBN. The development of human-like cognitive architectures has been an important goal of artificial intelligence (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 2008; Langley, Laird, & Rogers, 2009 ) for a review). Classic approaches include the SOAR architecture (Newell, 1990) , advanced by Allan Newell, one of the founders of AI. SOAR has been under development since the 70s and aims at explaining human reasoning and problem solving. SOAR represents procedural long-term knowledge as symbolic production rules that associate operators to problem spaces. It represents a model of mind as disembodied intelligence and thus faces the symbol grounding problem (Verschure, 1993) . Similarly, ACT-R (Anderson, 2004) , the latest incarnation of a long lineage of cognitive architectures originated by John Anderson, is also concerned with providing a generic model of human cognition. ACT-R combines production rules with pattern associators to form a hybrid symbolic/sub-symbolic architecture. Other approaches, such as ICARUS (Langley, 2006) , use notions of concepts and skills, and of the hierarchical relationship between objects to achieve problem-solving behaviour. All these approaches face the fundamental symbol grounding problem. DAC does not while still being able to realize accepted cognitive tasks in a optimal way. Indeed, these symbolic approaches have been superseded by non-symbolic behaviour oriented approaches, i.e. their direct anti-thesis. The prototypical example is the subsumption architecture (SA) (Brooks, 1986) which would map onto the reactive layer of DAC. It should be emphasized, however, that in its original formulation SA did consider planning as one layer. An important distinction between the reactive layer of DAC and SA is that the latter equates the layers of the architecture with the different independent behaviors the agent needs to generate. DAC considers that the layers are distinguished on the basis of their ability to expand the spatiotemporal window of operation increasingly relying on memory. In addition, SA assumes strict independence of layers while DAC sees them as each providing essential functionality for the others: the reactive layer provides the conditions onto which the adaptive layer can acquire the state spaces on which the contextual layer acquires plans for action. The limitations of SA haven been demonstrated by its limited success in scaling up from avoiding obstacles with legged robots to social interaction in the Cog project.
Whilst architectures like SOAR, ACT-R, and ICARUS have been developed largely independently of advances in the brain sciences, a number of recent approaches have drawn more directly on our understanding of the functional architecture of the human brain (Demiris & Khadhouri, 2006; Dominey, Metta, Nori, & Natale, 2008; Prescott, Montes González, Gurney, Humphries, & Redgrave, 2006) . However, all of these theories and architectures are partial solutions focusing on specific subsets of the problem space. The more symbolic approaches have made important inroads in understanding the functional organization of cognition and behaviour. They however lack grounding in the real-world and its complexities and do access the constraints provided by the neuronal substrate. The brain oriented architectures face the complementary challenge of establishing the link to behavioural validation of sufficient complexity. This can be seen as a mind-brain dilemma where dependent on the anchoring of the model on either the symbolic or neuronal end of the spectrum the ability to explain the complementary domain is lost (Verschure, 1996) . DAC has succeeded in bridging this gap by having found validation in both domains.
Looking ahead the roadmap of DAC is well defined. As an integration platform DAC is focussing on both robust outdoor mobile robot platforms to validate neuroDAC in rodent like foraging tasks and on the humanoid robot iCub to generalize DAC towards social interaction (Luvizotto, Rennó-Costa, Pattacini, & Verschure, 2011) . In a range of complementary projects specific subsystems of the neuronal substrate are mapped onto neuroDAC or their specific properties further investigated. In particular the basal ganglia is targeted to advance conditional contextual processing, action selection and the interaction with declarative memory (Pennartz et al., 2011) and PFC. In terms of its overall functional objectives DAC is now targeting a fundamental property of brains: consciousness. The driving idea being this approach is that consciousness is a solution to an evolutionary problem that assist in adaptive behavior of complex organisms (Verschure, 2012) . Indeed, integration is seen as one of the defining features of consciousness (Tononi, 2008) . Following the overall DAC methodology where the machine is the theory, the 20 years goal is to see a theory of consciousness expressed in robots that will be able to co-exist with us (Dario et al., 2011) . Whether this will turn out to be the case will be demonstrated by who will author the manuscript celebrating the next 20 years of research in the Distributed Adaptive Control of the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus: me or my sentient robot companion.
